In the event of a complete blockade due to a crisis or war, Estonia’s food reserves should be sufficient to sustain the population for about one month; after that, citizens must be prepared to survive on their own for at least another week.
This approach is set out in an updated strategic document outlining the country’s security policy, according to a report by ERR.
In practice, this means that in the event of complete isolation — by air, land, and sea — Estonia must be capable of functioning autonomously without external connections for at least 30 days.
At the same time, the population is expected to be prepared to survive on their own for at least seven days.
The previous update to the core strategic document took place in 2023. Since then, the international security environment has changed significantly, so a review was initiated last fall.
The explanatory note to the new document emphasizes that Russia remains the greatest threat to the security of Estonia and that of the wider Euro-Atlantic community. Russia’s imperialist and aggressive policies are aimed at destroying the European security architecture, undermining the rules-based international order, and restoring its own sphere of influence.
The document also notes that over the past three years, the global security environment has become significantly less predictable, and the international order has become more vulnerable to external pressure.
This partly reflects a shift in US policy toward allies, as a result of which Europe is assigned a greater role in ensuring its own security.
Special attention in the document is given to China. On the one hand, it notes China’s involvement in supporting Russian aggression against Ukraine, alongside North Korea, Belarus, and Iran. On the other hand, it highlights the growth of China’s global influence in the economic and technological spheres, which strengthens its position on the international stage.
Compared to the 2023 version of the document, the new edition introduces the principle of “active defense.” At the same time, the concept of “territorial defense” is not being abandoned — it is a matter of supplementing the approach to prevent hostilities from occurring on the country’s territory.
In other words, the new strategy stipulates that Estonia will not surrender its territory to the enemy with the intention of subsequently liberating it, but will instead seek to shift hostilities onto the aggressor’s territory. This is expected to reduce civilian casualties.
The section on vital services emphasizes that the state’s resilience depends on their uninterrupted functioning and the overall crisis resilience of society. The important role of the national broadcaster in ensuring information resilience is highlighted separately.
Earlier, in March, the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces stated that the country would lose all its power plants after the start of a potential war.
