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Today, there is important news from Mali.
Here, Russian forces are no longer just retreating from advancing ground rebel units in Mali, but they are being pushed out from the air as well. Despite Russia deploying experienced instructors to protect the junta government, they were forced out after losing the air war essentially to tribes’ militias that had just started using drones.
Recently released battlefield footage shows Azawad FPV drone teams striking Russian bases, turning what should have been secure rear areas into constant danger zones. The low-cost kamikaze drones are hitting with precision, despite trucks and armored vehicles trying to escape their attacks. The intensity of the air assaults is forcing the Russian Africa Corps units into continuous movement, disrupting their logistics and ability to use bases as hideouts or help the government forces.
This marks a dramatic shift in how the war in Mali is being fought, as until recently, the conflict followed a classic insurgency model. Tuareg separatists and other rebel groups relied on improvised explosive devices, ambushes, and hit-and-run attacks. Their main focus was targeting supply routes by mining desert roads, attacking convoys with car bombs, and blockading key logistics corridors. This forced Malian and Russian units into a defensive posture, tying them down to convoy protection and base security rather than offensive counter-insurgency operations. Over time, this attritional strategy drained resources and limited government control extremely, allowing the rebels more presence, even though it rarely delivered decisive battlefield breakthroughs.
As has become increasingly common after the war in Ukraine, Azawad militants began experimenting with FPV drones, which added a definitive new layer to their tactics. Initially, their efforts were limited to a small number of commercial drones with basic modifications, as inexperienced operators meant that early strikes were sporadic and had only a limited impact. But over the following months, they adapted rapidly, with Azawad UAV units improving their drone assembly and piloting skills, integrated more effective warheads, and began coordinating drone strikes with ground operations for bigger impact.
This culminated in the current offensive, where these efforts matured into a fully integrated combat capability, meaning that FPV drones were no longer a supplemental tool but a central element of the battlefield. Unlike IED, which rely on the enemy moving into a trap, drones actively pursue targets in real time, eliminating safe zones and extending reach far beyond traditional ambush tactics.
This transformation turned the battlefield into a multi-threat environment, with Russian and junta units not only facing pressure from advancing ground forces but simultaneously being under constant aerial surveillance and attack. This resulted in increased casualties, disrupted command and control, and a growing psychological toll on troops forced to operate under an unseen, persistent threat. In such conditions, new to the African battlefield, holding isolated desert outposts became increasingly untenable, accelerating Russia’s decision to retreat.
The apparent absence of Russian countermeasures makes this development even more important, as despite the presence of Russian Africa Corps instructors, many of which have experience fighting in Ukraine, there is little evidence of effective electronic warfare countermeasures or FPV drones of their own being deployed. The FPV footage from the militants itself is telling, as drones strike freely inside Russian positions, with no visible jamming, interception, or layered defense. Even basic electronic warfare could have reduced the effectiveness of such attacks, yet it appears largely absent.
Russia may have underestimated the rebels, assuming they lacked the capability to deploy drones at scale. However, the main reason is that Russia’s most advanced drone and counter-drone systems are heavily concentrated in Ukraine, where the intensity of the war demands constant prioritization. This leaves Russian expeditionary forces like those in Mali under-equipped and exposed, and as a result, Russian units effectively became easy targets, as war is changing and everyone is adapting, but Russia is not able to keep up the pace, even in places where it wants to stay.
