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Today, there is grim news from Russia.
Here, even pro war voices are warning that the country is entering an absolute demographic death spiral, with the war against Ukraine causing damage that may be irreparable across Russia’s military and economy. What makes this especially dangerous is that the losses are no longer only defining the battlefield, but reshaping the Russian state and society in ways that could leave Russia unable to recover even if the war stops.
This goes beyond a normal wartime setback, as a country can survive military losses if it still has a healthy population, a flexible economy, and a society oriented toward rebuilding, but Russia is losing all three at once. Between two thousand eighteen and two thousand twenty five, Central Asia recorded around three point five million more births than Russia, while Russia itself registered only around one point one million newborns in two thousand twenty five. That means Russia is not just having fewer children, but steadily losing the human base needed to sustain future growth and stability.
The war then amplifies this long term weakness into a much sharper national crisis, because Russia entered the invasion with a declining birth rate and an aging population, only for the war to pull more than a million of men out of civilian life through mobilization. Analysis based on inheritance registry data suggests that around three hundred fifty two thousand Russian soldiers have already died, at minimum. Additionally, the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that on top of this, approximately eight-hundred seventy-five thousand Russian soldiers were either wounded in battle, captured, or missing. Because these losses are concentrated for a large part in the very age groups that sustain families, labor markets, and future birth rates, they also weaken the social and economic base Russia would need for any recovery.
However, Russia is not just losing men in the war, but also the vast amounts of material resources and finances being poured into it. New research found that Russia has lost approximately two-hundred seventy-four billion dollars’ worth of military equipment, munitions, and logistics. With this context it is important to understand clearly that all money and material resources invested into defense is essentially lost capital; it is either destroyed on the battlefield, or will eventually be destroyed in storage, with its only value being the defense of the home country and its people. As Russia instead choses to spend this capital on the offense in trying to annex its neighbor, this value is directly lost on a goal that will not better the lives of its own people.
From there, the war spreads its effects into Russian society itself, as military service and wartime loyalty increasingly shape who advances and what the state rewards. Programs like Time of Heroes, which channel veterans into positions of public authority, and youth militarization initiatives that expose children to military discipline from an early age show that this is no longer just about sustaining the war effort, but about reshaping the institutions and values surrounding everyday life. As this continues, civilian priorities such as education, economic modernization, and outward engagement are pushed further aside, because the state is increasingly preparing society for long term mobilization rather than long term development.
The same trap is visible in the economy, where the long term consequences may be even harder to reverse, because Russia has redirected large parts of its industry toward sustaining the war effort. In the short term, this can create the appearance of stability, as factories remain active and defense orders keep money circulating, but a militarized economy produces far fewer civilian gains, distorts investment, and leaves entire regions financially dependent on military spending. At the same time, Russia’s isolation from Western markets is limiting access to advanced technology, investment, and broader commercial integration, reducing the country’s ability to modernize outside wartime production. Russia therefore needs the war to stop, but the longer its economy depends on military production and wartime spending, the harder it will be to unwind the system that now keeps large parts of the country functioning.
